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Purpose: The independence of the economic policy of national states in the European Union is a relevant 
and politically controversial issue as notions of lost sovereignty are often evoked by populist political op-
tions. It is therefore important to distinctly outline the actual state of affairs. 
Methodology: Methodology is descriptive and comparative. The article starts by surveying traditional and 
recent political, institutional and economic arguments on policy convergence in areas undergoing eco-
nomic integration. The article continues by contrasting the complex notion of economic sovereignty and 
the ongoing development of economic policy constrictions of EU (and eurozone) membership. Croatia is 
then compared to relevant economies in key economic policies in response to the crisis of 2008/09 in order 
to evaluate the maneuvering room left by the various policy constrictions.
Results: Particular attention is devoted to the comparison of exchange rate policy, fiscal policy and mon-
etary policy employed by member states in response to the crisis of 2008/09. While economic independ-
ence in terms of crisis management is clearly reduced by virtue of EU and eurozone membership, its effects 
should not be felt as a change of policy direction in the case of Croatia.
Conclusion: We conclude that the policy restrictions imposed by EU membership and expected entry into the 
eurozone are in line with economic restraints and exhibited national policy preferences prior to EU accession. 
Keywords: Economic policy constrictions, monetary policy, fiscal policy, EU, Croatia
1. Introduction: relevance of the independence 
issue
The issue of economic policy independence for EU 
members is relevant at least for two reasons. Firstly, 
it is politically contested, and it may be operation-
alized as threatening national sovereignty or well-
being. Secondly, it is economically contested, as dif-
fering schools of thought have conflicting opinions 
on economic integration and policy convergence. 
Therefore, it is important to tackle the issue with 
regard to the political economy of the matter, in 
hopes of adding to the existing scientific discourse.
Independence of economic policy of national states 
in the European Union is often evoked by populist 
political options, providing an increasingly pressing 
political issue. Populism has swept the developed 
world since the crisis of 2008/09. Its proponents 
claim to represent the authentic will of the people, 
unlike the political mainstream, and often carry a 
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protectionist message – frequently viewing the 
market relations with other countries as inherently 
exploitative. In the US, a gradual shift in the Re-
publican Party eventually culminated in the Trump 
presidency, vowing to “make America great again” 
by putting America first and draining the swamp 
of Washington bureaucracy. In Europe, a wave of 
parties emerged to challenge the prevailing politi-
cal elites, often using an anti-EU platform. From 
UKIP and Brexit Party in the UK and Alternative 
für Deutschland in Germany to Movimento 5 Stelle 
in Italy, Syriza in Greece and Živi zid in Croatia – 
these parties often find their countries exhausted 
by their foreign economic ties, and the various 
constrictions stemming from EU membership (e.g. 
austerity or migration) and must put themselves 
first, which they cannot do as long as they are pres-
sured by the bureaucracy in Brussels.
The economic side of the debate is also vibrant, with 
the more economically liberal leaning economists 
generally favoring economic integrations as a path 
to a broader scope for market- based coordination, 
while prominent Keynesians like Paul Krugman 
and Joseph Stiglitz find fault with the deeper end 
of integrations – particularly the common currency 
at the center of the European project itself and pro-
cyclical austerity measures at the center of its fis-
cal integration aspect. In this context, much energy 
has been devoted to discussing Optimum Currency 
Area criteria with the goal of ascertaining whether 
or not the euro harmed the economic prospects of 
the less competitive EU members.
The objective of this text is to assess the level of eco-
nomic independence in Croatia as an EU member, 
focusing on anti-crisis policies. The methodology 
is descriptive and comparative. The following two 
sections will offer an overview of relevant literature 
covering both traditional arguments on policy con-
vergence and recent research on economic inde-
pendence in the EU and EMU. Section 3 will also 
outline the concepts of economic independence 
and economic sovereignty and their growing con-
striction within the EU and EMU through post 
2008/09 institutional reforms. Section 4 compares 
Croatian post-2008 national economic policies to 
strategies in EU member states (fiscal policy, ex-
change rate policy and general monetary policy). 
Section 5 offers an interpretation of the somewhat 
specific Croatian position and strengthens the over-
all argumentation by providing the limited data on 
the policy responses to the still developing COVID 
recession of 2020. Section 6 concludes and suggests 
promising avenues for future research. 
2. Arguments for and against economic policy 
convergence
In its essence, the European project is an econom-
ic integration – and a harmonization of various 
economic policies is its important component. It 
started as an international strategic management of 
coal and steel resources, but developed into a cus-
toms union, single market and, finally, economic 
and monetary union. This step was symbolically 
vital as it introduced the salient common currency. 
However, it is very widely criticized as having been 
premature and destabilizing, crucially contribut-
ing to the macroeconomic imbalances which have 
made the 2009 recession and its aftermath so pain-
ful from the European perspective (e.g. Krugman, 
2012; Stiglitz, 2016). It should be helpful to provide 
a brief overview of traditional arguments, as well as 
the state of recent debates on economic policy con-
vergence in EU member states.
2.1 Traditional arguments 
At the basic theoretical level, closer trade integra-
tion is viewed as a positive outcome by definition. 
Today, this position is dominant amongst econo-
mists and social scientists in general and stands 
at the basis of liberalism, as it is traditionally con-
strued in the context of International Relations 
and International Political Economy. In fact, it has 
been dominant since Adam Smith’s refutation of 
mercantilists thought in 1776, gaining further trac-
tion though David Ricardo’s comparative advantage 
spin on Smith’s argument in 1817, the Heckscher-
Ohlin argument publication in 1933 and its further 
corollaries. These specific approaches have their 
clear differences, but at the heart of all of these is 
the conviction that close trade integration provides 
mutually beneficial specialization of all economies 
involved. Free trade forces all economies to special-
ize in what they may produce most competitively 
and leads to the best possible outcome in terms of 
goods available for consumption globally.
For markets to be fully efficient, free trade becomes 
a necessity, and any policy which inhibits it is not 
considered desirable: the overt ones, such as cus-
toms and quotas, and the covert ones, like the regu-
latory burden in the product markets. The deeper 
the integration, the broader the need for policy 
coordination, and it soon moves far beyond trade 
policy. Most notably, the creation of the common 
currency has brought forth issues of urgency con-
sidering the appropriate institutional framework 
to support the new currency. A salient position in 
this debate has been taken by the Optimum Cur-
Lučev, J., et al.: Economic policy independence in EU member states: Political economy of Croatian membership
227Vol. 34, No. 1 (2021), pp. 225-240
rency Area (OCA) literature (starting with Mundel, 
1961, and McKinnon, 1963), which attempted to 
outline the institutional underpinnings of a suc-
cessful currency union. This success could best be 
measured by the absence of asymmetric shocks 
such as the ones that obviously befell the eurozone 
in the post-2008 phase. However, at the beginning 
of the introduction of the euro, the consensus was 
shifting in favor of currency unions (for a contem-
porary review see Mongelli, 2002), and the political 
and symbolical drive towards a common currency 
was joined by the obvious traditional arguments 
in its favor. These included avoiding currency fluc-
tuations (and therefore facilitating trade and invest-
ment) and better macroeconomic policy (Sandbu, 
2015, p. 15-16).
In terms of general outlook, the liberal school of 
international trade has been somewhat supplanted 
by the more nuanced approach in the New trade 
theory (starting with Dixit & Stiglitz, 1977), which 
is not against free trade, but does recognize that 
large clusters of production may have a competitive 
edge over smaller and developing economies due to 
economies of scale. In other words, free trade may 
also have adverse effects in certain situations and 
for certain economies. From New trade sprouted 
the New economic geography and the continued 
focus on the geographically divergent results of free 
trade. In effect, we could argue that the free mar-
ket in trade, although generally positive, does not 
necessarily create an equally positive outcome for 
all parties concerned. Therefore, we could also ar-
gue that the policy-convergence underpinnings of 
economic integration become a supremely political 
issue. In other words, some economies may have far 
greater interests in promoting closer economic in-
tegration within the same space than others.
An additional argument comes to us in the form 
of literature on comparative capitalisms, best ex-
emplified by the Varieties of Capitalism approach 
(Hall & Soskice, 2001; Becker, 2009; Nölke, 2016). 
The basic idea is that, in terms of policies and in-
stitutions, there is more than one path to economic 
success and development. The original iteration 
of this literature (i.e. the Hall and Soskice edited 
volume of 2001) argued for the existence of coor-
dinated market economies (CMEs) and liberal mar-
ket economies (LMEs). The first group (exempli-
fied by Germany and Japan, but including Nordic 
countries, Austria, Switzerland, Belgium and the 
Netherlands) developed specific skill sets, slow-
moving bank-centric financial systems, strong and 
active trade unions and other strategically oriented 
institutional solutions. The second group (exem-
plified by the USA, but including Canada, Ireland, 
the UK, Australia and New Zealand) developed 
non-specific skill sets, fast-moving stock-market-
centric financial systems, weak trade unions and 
other free-market oriented institutional solutions. 
In terms of growth, both worked, but in very differ-
ent complementary ways. Growth was logically tied 
to the consistent selection of compatible policies, 
which formed at least two distinct sets. The sub-
sequent generations of research focused on over-
coming this binary structure and including a much 
wider array of countries, but also on introducing 
more variables. Of particular interest to us is the 
strand of literature that focused on macroeconomic 
management policies (e.g. Carlin & Soskice, 2009; 
Hall & Gingerich, 2014). These authors developed 
the idea that conservative fiscal policy is essentially 
favored by CME countries as it is compatible with 
their policy choices. Likewise, discretionary fiscal 
policy is favored by LME countries. This creates a 
possible problem, as it could mean that the macro-
economic monitoring structure that has developed 
in the past ten years in the EU is essentially the 
promotion of policies that are favored by Germany, 
but perhaps work to the detriment of many other 
member states, as they remain incompatible with 
the rest of their institutions and policies.
2.2 Recent debates 
In terms of convergence, EMU has produced high 
degrees of GDP and consumption synchronization 
among the twelve core member states (Imbs & Pau-
wels, 2019). However, the asymmetric shocks since 
2008 have drawn criticisms of the eurozone along 
the lines of OCA (see Krugman, 2013; Eichengreen, 
2014). Some of the crucial reforms within the euro-
zone (see the following section) have followed the 
OCA criteria in that a significant issue was found 
to be the absence of a fiscal union. This has enacted 
a policy convergence in the macroeconomic man-
agement field, through which a similar approach to 
fiscal policy is enforced, and whereby conservative 
and effectively pro-cyclical fiscal policy is intended 
to preserve the euro. This fiscal policy conserva-
tism is a particular thorn in the Keynesian side of 
the debate, as the equalization of fiscal policies in 
crises suggests a failure of aggregate demand man-
agement in an economically integrated area. As the 
argument goes, Germany could have offset the nec-
essary austerity programs on the periphery of the 
eurozone by conducting a massive fiscal stimulus, 
which would have provided an export market for 
the peripheral economies. However, if the general 
prescription is for all countries to enact austerity at 
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once, then the result can only be a protracted reces-
sion as the economically integrated area provides a 
very relevant network of export markets – and the 
universal austerity suggests that the bulk of exports 
contracts from the perspective of any given country 
(Krugman, 2012; Gaysset et al., 2019). This anti-
interventionist streak invites criticism towards an 
overly free-market or “neoliberal” orientation of the 
EU (e.g. Lütz & Kranke, 2014). However, it is worth 
noting that the policies favored in the European 
Semester (see below) are not always free-market 
oriented. Haas et al. (2020) code the Country Spe-
cific Recommendations in order to ascertain if they 
are dominantly in favor or against government in-
tervention and conclude that the frequent calls for 
fiscal restraint and labor market flexibilization are 
tempered by social protection concerns. This is a 
significant issue as institutionally oriented research 
suggests that this deliberate influence may be in 
conflict with national varieties of capitalism and 
their growth models which may be discerned even 
in small and open economies (Johnston & Regan, 
2018; Bohle, 2018).
Specific national contexts clearly have both an 
economic and a political component. In terms of 
economic context, EMU itself clearly provides a 
new playing field. Obstfeld (2013) and Canale et 
al. (2018) approach the issue of economic policy 
constrictions in the eurozone through the famous 
open economy policy trilemma of the early 1960s 
Mundell–Fleming model in which only two of three 
desirable objectives (fixed exchange rates, inde-
pendent monetary policy and free capital mobility) 
can plausibly be maintained. With the elimination 
of national monetary policies through the euro, and 
the institutional reforms since the 2009 recession, 
the issue is transformed. Free capital mobility is 
now joined by fiscal policy flexibility and financial 
stability as the new trilemma providing a modern 
set of policy constrictions for the eurozone mem-
bers. It is also clear that in the wake of Brexit, politi-
cal issues increase in visibility, as it is not only eco-
nomic arguments, but their legitimacy and support 
that will drive the outcomes of the process of Euro-
pean integration. However, Târlea et al. (2019) offer 
a reminder that these issues are always entangled. 
They analyze a governmental preferences dataset 
and conclude that economic factors are far better 
predictors of support for high degrees of European 
integration than political factors (e.g. public opin-
ion or presence of Eurosceptic parties). Particularly, 
the exposure of the financial sector is found to be 
the most important element in inducing govern-
ments in the direction of integration.
Finally, from the point of view of Croatia, the entry 
into the eurozone is favored as the monetary and 
exchange rate policy is already geared towards the 
euro. This suggests that losing exchange-rate flex-
ibility is not a significant issue as its maneuvering 
space is extremely limited already. On the other 
hand, the positive sides for a small, open economy 
include political influence, trade and investment, 
greater macroeconomic and financial stability, ac-
cess to the ECB’s refinancing facilities removing 
the risks of high shares of foreign-currency in the 
financial system (Dabrowski, 2019, p. 40)
3. Constrictions to national policy in the EU
Sovereignty from an economic viewpoint may 
be defined as “supreme legal authority within the 
geographical boundaries of the nation, giving na-
tional authorities autonomy over the regulation of 
economic activity inside the country through leg-
islation, administration, and judicial enforcement” 
(Kletzer, 2018, p. 12721). The autonomy to formu-
late economic policy, particularly in response to 
crises could also be added to this definition. In this 
respect, the notion of sovereignty or independence 
could be seen as antithetical to EU membership. EU 
has clearly moved far beyond mere market integra-
tion, and its integration process includes the pool-
ing of core state powers such as money and fiscal 
affairs (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018). The most 
intensive integration revolves around the eurozone 
issue. Two decades ago, the project of European 
integration was marked by the discrepancy of the 
euro as a currency without a state, whereby the EU 
itself became a polity in the making (Padoa-Sciop-
pa, 2004, p. 35). However, in the reform-oriented 
experimentation in transcending the missing state, 
national sovereignties of the EU member states are 
logically impinged upon. The very development 
of EU and eurozone has been marked by the ma-
neuvering around sovereignty at each turn, and its 
continuation may involve a choice between break-
ing the national sovereignty barrier altogether and 
slowly disentangling by returning fiscal sovereignty 
to member-states (Mody, 2018).
However, it should be clear that sovereignty is not 
relinquished by entering the European Union, as 
member states partake in the decision making 
process and may leave the Union if dissatisfied. It 
should also be clear that the nature of economic 
governance in the EU is complex and is not clearly 
described either by intergovernmentalism (which 
would retain sovereignty) or supranationalism 
(which would not) (Schmidt, 2016). The very con-
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cepts of sovereignty and independence must there-
fore be understood as subtle and fluid.
It is perhaps more useful to focus on the specific 
ways in which the maneuvering space of economic 
policies is constricted. The formation of the euro-
zone as the closest type of economic integration 
within the EU was followed uncomfortably closely 
by the disastrous consequences of the 2008 finan-
cial crisis, the 2009 recession, and the Sovereign 
Debt Crisis in 2010. These manifested differently 
across member states providing the EU with an 
asymmetrical shock which underlined two further 
asymmetries. Namely, from its beginnings EMU 
revolved around an asymmetry of integration with 
more integration in the “monetary union” and less 
in the “economic union”. The third asymmetry was 
made obvious with the handling of the debt crisis 
– one between the core and the periphery of the 
eurozone (Howarth & Verdun, 2020). The political 
aspects of the European project were shaken to the 
core (as mentioned in Section 1, with current politi-
cal consequences as well), and the euro was taken 
under scrutiny, allowing for a rethinking of avail-
able mechanisms in order to supply a better sup-
porting architecture for this more advanced stage 
of economic integration. The two general directions 
in which these evolved were the formulation of a 
stability mechanism (to support the countries hard-
est hit) and a fiscal integration (to prevent policy 
variety in terms of fiscal responsibility). Table 1 
summarizes these developments.
Table 1 New institutional mechanisms favoring macroeconomic management convergence
DATE  
OF REFORM TYPE OF REFORM AND SHORT DESCRIPTION
May 2010
European Financial Stabilization Mechanism
Ad hoc instrument created for the financial support of Ireland and Portugal 
Maximum capacity of providing 60 billion euro
Backed by the budget of the EU
May 2010
European Financial Stability Facility
Ad hoc instrument used for providing the needed financial assistance to Ireland, Portugal and Greece. 
Capacity to issue 440 billion euro
Guaranteed by member states
January 2011
European Semester





Reinforcement of Stability and Growth Pact, providing greater sanctions for the failure to meet the 
convergence criteria of public debt kept below 60% of GDP and budget deficits kept below 3%
Includes the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure
October 2012
European Stability Mechanism
Permanent stability mechanism (effectively replacing EFSM and EFSF) used to provide financial as-
sistance to Cyprus, Spain and Greece





Intergovernmental treaty binding for 19 eurozone members, and Romania, Bulgaria and Denmark 
as opt-ins
The fiscal compact further strengthening budgetary discipline




New capacity for financial regulation of eurozone members for the ECB
Source: Hodson (2015, p. 179); ESM (2019); Maletić et al. (2019)
The changes summarized in Table 1 enabled a more 
comprehensive process of policy harmonization with 
the European Semester combining the Stability and 
Growth Pact with the Europe 2020 strategy (smart 
growth, sustainability, inclusiveness) with the new 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure (which ex-
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panded surveillance to private debt, financial sector 
and unemployment). These changes also strengthened 
the existing framework – i.e. the Stability and Growth 
Pact, which was in place since the late 1990s as an at-
tempt to enforce the Maastricht criteria on debt (60% 
GDP) and deficit (3% GDP). The Pact now has effective 
preventive and corrective arms, and Croatia has found 
itself subjected to the latter, i.e. the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure (EDP) for the violation of both the debt and 
deficit rules in the January 2014-July 2017 period. EDP 
provided goals in deficit management for the 2014-
2016 period, and Croatia managed to sufficiently con-
trol the deficit in 2015 and 2016 in order to successfully 
exit the EDP (see Maletić et al., 2019).
The European Semester brought complex and sub-
tle changes to policy coordination with the effect of 
achieving coordination of economic policies without 
further transferring of sovereignty to the EU level 
(Verdun & Zeitlin, 2018). However, these constric-
tions on economic independence depend on the le-
gitimacy for political sustainability. Crum and Merlo 
(2020) note that the monetary and economic aspects 
of EMU have depended on different types of legiti-
mation, with the monetary aspect relying on out-
put legitimacy (legitimized by the resulting visible 
improvements) and the economic aspect relying on 
input legitimacy (legitimized by the transparent and 
democratic political input). This is significant as Eu-
ropean economic governance increasingly acts as a 
constraint on both governments’ decisions on fiscal 
policy and the ability of parliaments to contest them, 
which suggests a significant loss of input legitimacy 
(Crum & Merlo, 2020, pp. 406-407).
Parliaments are generally expected to oversee fis-
cal policy by scrutinizing and approving a budget-
ary proposal forwarded by the government. While 
the post-crisis reforms did nothing to formally di-
minish such oversight, supranational surveillance 
increased its “scope, depth and bite” (Crum, 2018, 
p. 273), and realistically pushed governments into 
a “defensive and reactive mode” (ibid, p. 274). Na-
tional parliaments themselves would sometimes 
respond by seeking a more proactive role, and it is 
worth noting that the diminishing power of parlia-
ments with respect to budgets represents a histori-
cal trend that far precedes the post-crisis reforms 
of European economic governance (Jančić, 2016).
In a more general sense, the reforms outlined in Ta-
ble 1 strengthened the economic policy harmoniza-
tion in the areas that were deemed necessary to com-
plement the high, but apparently unfinished stage of 
economic integration of a common currency. In this 
sense, the level of economic integration, if it is con-
sistent rather than self-defeating, logically constricts 
economic policy. A free trade area or a customs un-
ion would necessarily restrict tariff policy, and still 
deeper integrations like the European Single Market 
logically extend this to factor movements (i.e. the 
four freedoms of movement: capital, labor, goods 
and services). Consistence requires harmonization 
starting in market regulation, and the further step 
toward a currency union removed the possibility of 
an exchange rate policy, requiring, logically, fiscal in-
tegration and financial regulation harmonization. It 
took a severe post-2008 asymmetric shock to propel 
these changes, but the vulnerability itself was a result 
of a faulty structure and cannot simply be ascribed 
to the exogenous element of the crisis. The current 
framework, however, completes the logical steriliza-
tion of independent anti-cyclical economic policy. 
Alongside the old removal of international trade 
policy, and the implicit removal of exchange rate and 
monetary policy for eurozone members, we must 
now also accept the inability of independent fiscal re-
sponse. The next section will take a look at how this 
may affect Croatia (whether the EU membership and 
the expected future eurozone membership change 
anything) in the context of various other strategies 
for crisis management in the EU since 2008.
4. The past crisis responses
The previous two sections have touched upon the 
complexities of economic independence in the con-
text of European integration. As national level eco-
nomic policies occur in specific institutional contexts, 
their consistent application may be indicative of na-
tional institutional preferences which further tie into 
growth models. A careful approach may help us dis-
cern whether or not future constrictions upon these 
can be construed to limit economic independence or 
merely provide stronger policy preferences without a 
change in their direction. This section surveys the re-
sponses to the past crisis (2008-2019) in all current EU 
members and the UK. It takes stock of three aspects 
of anti-cyclical policies: monetary, fiscal and exchange 
rate policy – in order to compare those strategies to 
the increasingly narrow maneuvering space given to 
individual states by the developing architecture of 
macroeconomic constraints described above. We 
focus on Croatia in order to be able to conclude on 
evolving position of economic policy availability.
4.1 Depreciation episodes
Figure 1 shows monthly changes to exchange rates 
against the euro in the 2008-2011 period. The data 
suggest significant depreciation episodes in late 
2008 and early 2009 for several economies.
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Figure 1 Nominal exchange rates in current non-euro EU members in 2008-2011 (monthly % change 
against EUR)
e 1 Nom inal exchange rat s in current non-euro EU m em bersin 2008-2011 (m onthly % change against EUR) 
 
Source: O wn calculation based on Eurostat (2019)1 - Euro/national currency exchange rates 
Polish złoty would reach the record m onthly nom inal depreciation of 9.9% against the euro in February 2009, and the 
average exchange rate in 2009 was a substantial 23.4% weaker against the euro com pared to the average rate for 2008. 
Pound sterling would depreciate at the record m onthly rate of 8.9% in Decem ber 2008 (the yearly nom inal average for 
2009 was 11.3% weaker com pared to the average for 2008, or 30.9% weaker com pared to the average for 2007). The 
Hungarian forint would depreciate at the record nom inal rate of 8.1% in O ctober 2008 (the yearly nom inal average for 
2009 was 11.5% weaker com pared to the average for 2008). The Rom anian leu would depreciate at the record nom inal 
m onthly rate of 8% in January 2009 (the yearly nom inal average for 2009 was 15.2% weaker com pared to the average for 
2008, or 26.9% weaker com pared to the average for 2007). Finally, the Swedish krona would depreciate at the record 
nom inal m onthly rate of 6.2% in Decem ber 2008 (the yearly nom inal average for 2009 was 10.4% weaker com pared to the 
average for 2008, or 14.8% weaker com pared to the average for 2007). 
In contrast with these, Bulgarian lev did not fluctuate at all, m aintained as it is by a currency board (for this reason it is 
not shown in the graph). Danish krone (as well as the Lithuanian litas, Latvian lat and Estonian krone – not shown in the 
figure – which existed during 2009 but were eventually introduced to the eurozone) did not fluctuate substantially. The 
Croatian kuna falls in between these two poles – with the record m onthly depreciation rate of 1.9% in February 2009, 
suggesting a substantial degree of stability (and the yearly average exchange rate in 2009 only 1.7% weaker com pared to 
the average rate for 2008). This is a result of the dedication to the stability of the HRK/EUR exchange rate as a 
fundam ental aspect of the Croatian econom y (see below). It follows that the econom y m ost com parable to Croatia in 
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Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat (2019)1 - Euro/national currency exchange rates
 łoty would reach th  record monthly omi-
nal depreciation of 9.9% against the euro in February 
2009, and the average exchange rate in 2009 was a 
substantial 23.4% weaker against the euro compared 
to the average rate for 2008. Pound sterling would 
depreciate at the record onthly rate of 8.9% in De-
cember 2008 (the yearly nominal average for 2009 
was 11.3% weaker compared to the average for 2008, 
or 30.9% weaker compared to the average for 2007). 
The Hungarian forint would depreciate at the record 
nominal rate of 8.1% in October 2008 (the ye rly 
nominal average for 2009 was 11.5% weaker com-
pared to the average for 2008). The Romanian leu 
would depreciate at the record nominal monthly rate 
of 8% in January 2009 (the yearly nominal average for 
2009 was 15.2% weaker compared to the average for 
2008, or 26.9% weaker compared to the average for 
2007). Finally, the Swedish krona would depreciate at 
the record nominal monthly rate of 6.2% in Decem-
ber 2008 (the yearly nominal average for 2009 was 
10.4% weaker compared to the average for 2008, or 
14.8% weaker compared to the averag  for 2007).
In contrast with these, Bulgarian lev did not fluctu-
ate at all, maintained as it is by a currency board 
(for this reason it is not shown in the graph). Dan-
ish kr ne (as well as the L thuanian litas, Latvian 
lat and Estonian krone – not shown in the figure 
– which existed during 2009 but were eventually 
introduced to the eurozone) did not fluctuate sub-
stantially. The Croatian kuna falls in between these 
two poles – with the record monthly depreciation 
rate of 1.9% in February 2009, suggesting a sub-
stantial degree of stability (and the yearly average 
exchange rat  in 2009 only 1.7% weaker compared 
to the average rate for 2008). This is a result of the 
dedication to the stability of the HRK/EUR ex-
change rate as a fundamental aspect of the Croatian 
economy (see below). It follows that the economy 
ost comparable to Croatia in terms of dedication 
to the euro exchange rate is Bulgaria, another small, 
post-socialist economy with high euroization of the 
economy. In terms of the loss of exchange rate flex-
ibility through eurozone membership, we should 
add five other small, post-socialist economies of 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia.
4.2 Fiscal response
Figure 2 shows the changes in net lending/borrow-
ing positions as ratios to GDP for the several years 
following the 2008 financial crisis (2008-2011) for 
all current EU member economies and the UK.1 Eurostat (2019). https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database
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Figure 2 Net lending/borrowing % GDP 2008-2011
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The two extreme groups of countries in Figure 2 are 
countries with notably sound finances and those with 
extr ely poor on s. The first group is dominate  
by Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden), 
with the addition of Luxemburg, while the second is 
presided by Ireland and Greece, followed by Portu-
gal and Spain. These four worst performers were all 
captured by the stabilization programs in the 2010-
2012 period (some of these astounding deficits were 
clearly a result of the bail-out programs themselves, 
assigning funds via the national budget).
Disregarding the countries whose budgets were 
under the control of the conditioned stabilization, 
the largest fiscal activity could be seen in the UK, 
Lithuania, Slovakia, Poland and Croatia. Such data 
should be handled carefully for several reasons: 
firstly, the denominator effect in any data expressed 
as a percentage of GDP suggests it is highly sensi-
tive to changes in GDP – and if GDP suffers a sharp 
decline, public deficits and public debt as a percent-
ag  of GDP would rise even if the nominal levels 
were declining as long as they were declining at a 
slower rate than the decline in GDP (De Grauwe 
and Yi, 2013). This suggests that periods in which 
countries suffer strong but variable GDP contrac-
tions are the worst periods to compare their indi-
cators as a ratio of GDP. Secondly, a rising deficit 
may be a result of a falling public revenue level, an 
increasing public expenditure level, a deterioration 
in loaning onditi ns, or any combination of th se 
factors. It is therefore difficult to discern specific 
anti-cyclical strategies merely from these data. To 
see how much of the change in net borrowing as a 
percentage of GDP was a result of fiscal stimulus, 
we have to compare the levels of revenue and x-
penditure. Figure 3 does so for Croatia.
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Figure 3 Government revenue and expenditure in Croatia (millions HRK)
Source: IM F (2019) 
The data are shown in nom inal HRK. O n the revenue side, there was a substantial decline in the 2008-2011 period – 
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to their 2008 level by 2014 (or 2016 if we correct for inflation). In com parison, the expenditure side m oved very little. 
There was a nom inal increase in the 2008-2011 period (4.2 billion HRK or +2.7%), however, if we correct for inflation, the 
result is a nearly 3% decrease in real expenditure (and by 2013 this would turn to a 10.25% decrease since 2008). The 
nom inal level of 2008 expenditure was regained by 2015, and correcting for inflation, its level was alm ost reached only in 
2018 (99.86%). The data on expenditure and revenue suggest that Croatian fiscal policy was certainly not involved in a 
fiscal stim ulus and that its debt problem s stem m ed from  the failings of the revenue side (expected during a downturn). In 
other words, fiscal policy exacerbated and fed the prolonged negative growth of the 2009-2014 period. 
In order to provide a m eaningful com parison of these two trends, we choose Slovenia, an econom y with num erous 
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The data are shown in nominal HRK. On the revenue 
side, there was a substantial decline in the 2008-2011 
period – from 147.9 billion HRK to 135.5 billion 
HRK or -8.4% (and if we correct for inflation using
the index values in IMF’s WEO database we reach an 
even steeper decline of -13.4%). The nominal revenue 
levels afterwards increased, recovering to their 2008 
level by 2014 (or 2016 if we correct for inflation). In 
comparison, the expenditure side moved very little. 
There was a nominal increase in the 2008-2011 pe-
riod (4.2 billion HRK or +2.7%), however, if we cor-
rect for inflation, the r sult is a nearly 3% decreas  
in real expenditure (and by 2013 this would turn to 
a 10.25% decrease since 2008). The nominal level of 
2008 expenditure was regained by 2015, and correct-
ing for inflation, its level was almost reached only in 
2018 (99.86%). The data on expenditure and revenue 
suggest that Croatian fiscal policy was cert inly not 
involved in a fiscal stimulus and that its debt prob-
lems stemmed from the failings of the revenue side 
(expected during a downturn). In other words, fiscal 
policy exacerbated and fed the prolonged negative 
growth of the 2009-2014 period.
In order to provide a m aningful comparison of 
these two trends, we choose Slovenia, an economy 
with numerous structural similarities (Babić & 
Lučev, 2019).
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Table 2 Central banks and their key interest rates
Central 
bank Key interest rates trends
ECB
November 2008 – start of decline of deposit rate, initially from 3.25% to 2.75%, eventually to 0.25 – 
initial and brief rebound in April 2011, hitting 0% by July 2012 and negative rates since June 2014 and 
standing at -0.5 since September 2019 (still at this level as of December 2019).
October 2008 – start of decline of Marginal lending facility, initially from 5.25% to 4.75%, initial and 
brief rebound also in April 2011, eventually dropping to 0.25 in September 2019 (still at this level as of 
December 2019).
The revenue trend manifested similarly in Slove-
nia. The nominal revenue fell in the 2008-2010 pe-
riod (-3.5%) and again in 2013 (-4% compared to 
2008 level). If we recalculate taking inflation into 
account, we can see that in 2008 prices, revenue 
was 6% lower by 2010 and 12% lower by 2013. 
However, expenditure followed a somewhat dif-
ferent pattern. Nominal expenditure continued 
growing after the recession started and fell only in 
2012 (by 5.2%) after which there was a notable in-
crease in 2013 (by 22.2%). Recalculating for infla-
tion, in real terms expenditure fell by 7.6% in 2012 
and grew by 20.1% in 2013. In other words, a fall 
in revenue was accompanied by a more active anti-
cyclical fiscal policy.
4.3 Monetary response
In the prevalent macroeconomic thought and prac-
tice before the crisis, macroeconomic policy focused 
on monetary policy. In turn, the prevalent crisis 
responses of monetary policy focused on key inter-
est rates (Blanchard et al., 2010). Table 2 shows the 
trends in the traditionally minded monetary policy – 
i.e. changes in key interest rates. It covers the period 
since the first responses to the 2008 financial crisis 
until December 2019 (prior to the development of 
COVID crisis, the response to which is essentially 
still being formulated) for ECB and all EU members 
(excluding the UK) currently not in the eurozone 
(Sweden, Denmark, Poland, Czechia, Hungary, Bul-
garia, Romania and Croatia). The key interest rates 
are reported under the types and titles identified by 
the websites of the central banks themselves.
Figure 4 Government revenue and expenditure in Slovenia (millions EUR)
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Central 
bank Key interest rates trends
Poland
November 2008 – start of decline of the deposit rate, initially from 4.5% to 4.25%, eventually reaching 
its first minimum of 2% in June 2009. Recovering since January 2011 eventually reaching 3.25% in Oc-
tober 2012. Dropping once more since November 2012, eventually to 0.5% in March 2015 (still at this 
level as of December 2019).
November 2008 – start of decline of the rediscount rate, initially from 6.25% to 6%, eventually reach-
ing its first minimum of 3.75% in June 2009. Recovering since January 2011 eventually reaching 5% in 
October 2012. Dropping once more since November 2012, eventually to 1.75% in March 2015 (still at 
this level as of December 2019).
November 2008 – start of decline of the Lombard rate, initially from 7.5% to 7.25%, reaching its first 
minimum of 5% in June 2009. Recovering since January 2010, it eventually reached 6.25% by October 
2012, dropping once more since November 2012 to reach 2.5% by March 2015 (still at this level as of 
December 2019).
Czechia
August 2008 – start of decline of the discount rate, initially from 2.75% to 2.50%, eventually dropping 
to 0.05% in November 2012 and then slowly recovering from August 2018, at 1.00% since May 2019.
August 2008 – start of decline of the Lombard rate, initially from 4.75% to 4.50%, steadily reaching 
0.25% by November 2012, recovering since August 2017 and standing at 3% since May 2019.
August 2008 – start of decline of the repo rate, initially from 3.75% to 3.50%, eventually reaching 0.05% 
in November 2012 and recovering since August 2017, standing at 2% since May 2019.
Sweden
October 2008 – start of decline of the repo rate, initially from 4.75% to 4.25%, reaching its first mini-
mum in April 2010 at 0.25% and recovering from July 2010 to eventually reach 2% in July 2011. Drop-
ping again since December 2011, initially to 1.75% and eventually reaching negative territory in Febru-
ary 2015 and a new minimum of -0.50% in February 2016. Recovering once more since January 2019 
and slated to reach 0% in January 2020.
Hungary
November 2008 – start of decline of the base rate, initially from 11.5% to 11% and eventually to its first 
minimum of 5.25% in April 2010. Recovering from November 2010 to 7% in December 2011, and 
dropping to 0.9% in May 2016 (still at this level as of December 2019).
Romania
February 2009 – start of decline of the deposit rate, initially from 6.25% to 6% and eventually to its first 
minimum of 1.25% March 2012, recovering briefly to 2.25% in May 2013, and resuming its decline since 
July 2013, reaching 0.25% in August 2014. Recovering since October 2017 and standing at 1.5% as of 
December 2019.
February 2009 – start of decline of the Credit facility rate, initially from 14% to 13.5% and eventually to 
2.75% in November 2017. Recovering since January 2018 this rate stands at 3.5% as of December 2019.
Croatia
June 2011 – the first of two decisions to reduce the discount rate – initially 9% to 7% and then to 3% in 
October 2015 (still at this level as of December 2019). 
November 2011 – the first of three decisions to reduce the Lombard rate, initially from 9% to 6.25%, and 
then to 5% in December 2013 and 2.5% in October 2015 (this category was switched to the overnight 
credit rate in September 2017 at the same level as of December 2019).
Bulgaria January 2009 – start of decline in the base rate, initially from 5.77% to 5.17%, and, apart from very brief and slight upticks consistently dropping (reaching below 0.1% in August 2018), at 0% as of December 2019.
Denmark
November 2008 – start of decline of the discount rate, initially from 4.5% to 4%, eventually reaching 
its first minimum of 0.75% in January 2010, slightly recovering since April 2011, eventually to 1.25% 
in July 2011 and dropping since November 2011, reaching 0% in July 2011 (still at this level as of De-
cember 2019).
November 2008 – start of decline of the lending rate, initially from 5.5% to 5%, eventually reaching its 
first minimum of 1.05% in January 2010, slightly recovering since April 2011, eventually to 1.55% in 
July 2011 and dropping since November 2011 (disregarding a slight uptick from 0.2% to 0.3% in the 
January-May 2013 period), reaching 0.05% in January 2015 (still at this level as of December 2019).
Sources: ECB (2019); CNB (2019); Riksbank (2019); NBP (2019); Danmarks Nationalbank (2019); HNB (2019); BNR 
(2019); MNB (2019); BNB (2019)
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Table 2 shows that almost all covered countries first 
responded in the August-November 2008 period. 
Bulgaria and Romania were slightly late and had 
their first reductions in January and February 2009. 
However, the real outlier is Croatia, which only re-
duced its key rates in 2011.
We have chosen the interest rates as the prevalent 
and easily comparable response, but monetary 
policy was naturally not limited to these changes 
(although the various expansionary measures ad-
opted across various economies cannot fall within 
the scope of the present text). In all, it took several 
years for ECB to truly commit to an expansive mon-
etary policy as a response to the ongoing multifold 
crisis, and it was in 2011 that ECB opened a strong 
expansionary program. Apart from the key inter-
est rates changes shown in Table 2, money supply 
increased from 42% of eurozone GDP to 67% in 
2016 (Rohatinski, 2019, p. 47). Croatian monetary 
policy is focused on inflation management with the 
exchange rate of kuna and euro as the anchor of 
this policy (HNB, 2019). Its anti-cyclical capabili-
ties were dramatically undercut for this reason, as 
dramatic emissions were out of the question. The 
extremely high rate of euroization of the Croatian 
economy suggested that a depreciation of kuna 
would necessarily deepen the recession. However, 
in the 2010-2012 period, the Croatian Central Bank 
reduced the obligatory reserves in the banking sec-
tor, releasing liquidity and managing a non-tradi-
tional anti-cyclical approach (Rohatinski, 2019, 
p. 52). In this, the severe limitations of Croatian 
monetary policy were somewhat circumvented by a 
one-off non-traditional approach. It remains clear, 
however, that the HRK-EUR limbo has held the 
Croatian monetary policy hostage and that Croa-
tia is so closely tied to euro issues, that it could not 
be considered “economically sovereign” even in the 
context of the crisis responses a decade ago. As we 
can observe from data in Table 2, Croatia is unique 
among the presented countries in following this as-
pect of restraint.
5. Past and future Croatian economic 
independence
In early 2020, the widespread measures intended 
to contain the COVID-19 epidemic have created a 
significant potential for a global recession. IMF ini-
tially projected the world GDP contraction for 2020 
at -3% in April 2020 (IMF, 2020a, p. 8), which was 
substantially lower than the 2009 global contraction 
of -0.1% (ibid, p. 6). By June 2020, IMF substantially 
downgraded its prediction of 2020 contraction to 
-4.9% (IMF, 2020b, p. 7). This recession is yet to 
fully develop, but it seems to be of world-shattering 
proportions. Particularly worrying are its underly-
ing causes, i.e. halting of transport, movement and 
production. These suggest that, even when the re-
cession has been overcome, the structure of global 
and national economic flows may change on a more 
permanent basis, dependent on the developments 
in epidemiological management. 
Croatia itself is poised to experience a substantial 
contraction, originally projected at -9% GDP in 
2020 (IMF, 2020a, p. 20). Prior to these develop-
ments, Croatia was well positioned to enter the 
eurozone in roughly 2023. The stipulations of the 
Stability and Growth Pact obligatory for eurozone 
members were introduced in the Croatian legal 
structure in January 2018 and the strategy to intro-
duce the euro was formally confirmed by the Croa-
tian Government in May 2018 (Maletić et al., 2019, 
pp. 55-57). With its entrance in the ERM II mecha-
nism in July 2020, Croatia is on its way to enter the 
deepest economic integration currently in force in 
the world, even as this may be complicated by the 
development of the recession. We are yet to witness 
the full development of this recession as well as the 
formulation of policy responses. So far, Croatia 
has responded in line with its previous crisis man-
agement positions. Monetary policy once more 
focused on the euro exchange rate and depended 
on non-traditional measures for the promotion of 
growth (HNB, 2020), while the proclaimed goal of 
fiscal policy response was to prevent an increase in 
overall expenditure (Lider, 2020). However, the spe-
cific nature of the covid crisis has been recognized 
at the EU level and the escape clause for the fiscal 
rules of the Stability and Growth Pact was activated 
in March 2020. This may set an important prece-
dent of a less punitive application of fiscal rules in 
crises.
We have outlined the institutional framework that 
Croatia will be maneuvering and focused on the el-
ementary crisis management policy constrictions. 
The previous section has shown the three types of 
policy response that will no longer be available fol-
lowing the expected entry into the eurozone: de-
preciation episodes, independent monetary policy 
and fiscal stimulus. While some EU members could 
depreciate its currency against the euro to help 
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the competitiveness of its exports, any eurozone 
member obviously cannot. And while some coun-
tries were able to spend their way to a higher GDP, 
stricter fiscal rules are now in place (although 2020 
has seen restraint in their application). Finally, in-
dependent monetary policy in the general sense is 
only possible outside the eurozone, as ECB tries to 
make policy decisions for the benefit of all of the 
member economies at once, which would be pos-
sible only if the business cycles were harmonized 
and shocks were not asymmetric.
However, all of this is not likely to change Croa-
tian economic policy for the worse as roughly the 
same tendencies have already been followed. We 
have shown that the Croatian crisis-related eco-
nomic policies have been extremely subdued and 
pro-cyclical. The reasons for this are structural and 
historic as the Croatian economy became euroized 
in the context of the rough transition period and 
extremely high inflation rates which were resolved 
through a strong management of the exchange rate 
of the Croatian kuna and the German mark (and the 
euro after its creation). By the time of the 2008/09 
events, it was impossible to depreciate the kuna for 
fears of causing an additional shock as well as mak-
ing debt servicing entirely intransigent. This has 
also drawn the need for a very subdued monetary 
policy in order to relieve the pressure on the kuna. 
Likewise, the fiscal policy was far from a stimulus 
and can only be described as a very troubled form 
of fiscal consolidation. If the European Semester 
agenda intensifies further, we would hope to see 
even more productive pressures towards a reform 
of the public sector, which could improve Croatian 
fiscal policy by making the state function more as 
a provider of common goods and less as a massive 
and undemanding employer of bureaucrats. This 
would create the crucial structural impetus to en-
able more flexibility in fiscal policy geared toward 
growth and development.
6. Conclusions and further research 
recommendations
Our objective has been to assess the level of Croa-
tian economic independence as an EU member. In 
sections 2 and 3 we have seen that national eco-
nomic policies develop in specific institutional, po-
litical and economic contexts and that the national 
preferences may be in conflict with the needs of 
the developing European integration. Of particular 
interest was the relationship between EU mem-
bership and economic sovereignty which we have 
found to be complex and fluid. While EU member-
ship is by definition a process involving a transfer 
of a number of sovereign economic prerogatives, 
this should not be construed as negative as long as 
the process is undertaken by a democratic coun-
try. We have taken the view that the issue of pos-
sible infringement on Croatian national economic 
policy independence is best analyzed by surveying 
the measures undertaken after the 2008/09 shock, 
which largely predate Croatian EU accession in 
2013. We have compared them to the experiences 
of other member states and contrasted them to the 
constrictions that would await Croatia upon euro-
zone membership. We are prepared to conclude 
that EU and future EMU membership does not 
represent pressures to significantly change the di-
rection of extant economic policy. Therefore, while 
Croatia is and will be faced by significant policy 
constrictions, its loss of economic independence is 
not troubling.
We would like to suggest two general avenues for 
further research. Firstly, the next several years will 
be spent in economic recovery. The response to the 
currently developing recession will provide new in-
sights into the functioning of the developing Euro-
pean integration project by focusing on the outlook 
of post-Brexit and post-COVID EU. Further re-
search should not ignore the effects of such changes 
on the small member economies. Secondly, there 
is a possibility of a contrast between the stylized 
national preferences as identified in comparative 
institutional literature and the outlined constric-
tions to economic governance. As we have shown, 
there is already some research dealing with these 
transformations. However, new circumstances will 
need further research on the mutual interactions of 
various institutional arrangements (old, nationally 
specific and new, EU led) and their long term effects 
on growth. The primary issue is whether or not eco-
nomic policy homogenization may produce adverse 
effects if it provides member states with growth 
models by which they come into close competition 
with one another.
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